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JUSTICE-WHATEVER HAPPENED To IT?
Stanley Sporkin*
N these dynamic times we are experiencing change at such a rapid
pace that I am among those in society who refrain from buying a new
gizmo because I fear it will be outmoded by the time I arrive home.
It was not too many months ago when I bought a new VCR only to learn
that it had been supplanted by a gadget called a DVD. Change is cer-
tainly in the air. We are communicating no longer through this nation's
great mail system but by use of something called "E-mail." Even our
phone system is going through radical changes. Long distance calls that
used to cost 25 cents a minute or more can now be made at pennies a
minute through use of the computer. Indeed, even the computer, which
more than anything else symbolizes the dynamic nature of the changes
that are taking place, may not be around in the not too distant future.
What I find interesting is that the changes taking place are not limited
to one segment of our society. The changes in the past, while substantial,
were not as sweeping as they are today. For example, in my lifetime, I
remember the transition from radio to television. That change was grad-
ual, occurring over a number of decades.
The changes that I now refer to are so sweeping that they are touching
all aspects of the way we live. They are even having a profound impact
on the two old line professions of medicine and the law. The transforma-
tions taking place in medicine are as deep seated as in any segment of our
society. On virtually a daily basis, we are unraveling all of life's secrets,
many of which have stood for many centuries.
In law the blessings from these dynamic changes are somewhat of a
mixed bag. With respect to the technical aspects of law, the new elec-
tronic toys have been a god-send. We are now able to research a problem
in a much more complete and thorough way virtually on a real time basis.
The way we litigate cases has also been transformed to the point where
we can hear and see witnesses in the courtroom appearing live from virtu-
ally anyplace in the world. Yes, my friend, we now have what I refer to as
the "Ted Koppel" courtroom.
These changes, along with the concepts of electronic filings and the
other steps being taken to reach the ultimate of a paperless court system,
are all for the good. The changes that are bothersome to me are those
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that seem to be taking the courts away from the great contributions they
made during the second and third quarters of the past century.
The call we hear daily from many of our political leaders is we do not
want judges to be judicial activists. While I do not really know what is
encompassed by the term judicial activism, I do know there are some in
society who say they want their judges to be so-called strict construction-
ists. Here again we have no precise definition.
In the past, I have railed against what I have termed so-called
"Magooist" judges. Those are judges who blindly follow the "law" no
matter where it leads with no or little regard to the consequences. Like
the legendary Mr. Magoo, a cartoon character from my early days, they
keep their heads down and are oblivious to the consequences, and even-
tually find themselves walking over the edge of a cliff.
As students of law soon to become lawyers, I ask you not to forget the
vital role the judiciary played in securing and protecting the rights of this
nation's citizens. A few years ago, I was called upon to pay tribute to a
dear friend of mine, Judge Charles Richey, who passed away in May 1997.
To set the stage for the discussion that will follow, I am going to quote
some of what I said on that occasion:
In this day and age, when judges are often attacked by the political
branches, we sometimes forget the vital role judges play in securing
and protecting the rights of this nation's citizens. Alex Sanders, a
former Justice of the South Carolina Supreme Court and current
President of the College of Charleston, made these poignant obser-
vations [some time ago]: "Wherever and whenever injustice has been
banished, conflict reconciled, and human understanding fostered,
judges and the judicial process have played a vital role." He noted, it
was not so long ago that the courageous judges of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit "translated the Supreme
Court's basic school desegregation decision, [Brown v. Board of Ed-
ucation,] into a broad mandate for racial justice and equality under
the law." He reminded the audience that courageous judges such as
Elbert P. Thttle, John Minor Wisdom, John R. Brown, Richard Tay-
lor Rives, Frank M. Johnson, Jr., and [my own circuit's] beloved J.
Skelly Wright not only "accepted the Constitutional philosophy that
extended downward from the Warren Court, but reinforced it up-
ward and outward, stretching and expanding the law to protect rights
and liberties granted by the Constitution."
Those judges were attacked, just as some of our best judges are at-
tacked today. Those judges were willing to stick their necks out to
protect the vital rights of all minorities, and, in doing so, quite possi-
bly averted another civil war. President Sanders put it this way: "No-
body-not generals or admirals, not preachers, not journalists, not
legislators, not governors, not even Presidents-have shaped
America as profoundly as the judicial process."
[I went on to ask] the question: how long could this nation have sur-
vived on a segregated basis. One might ask what corresponding cou-
rageous action was taken by the Executive and Congressional
branches? I submit often in the Warren Court years they stood on
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the sidelines or tried to impede the progress mandated by these mag-
nificent judges.
Perhaps the slogan, "Impeach Earl Warren," that appeared on
bumper stickers over forty years ago in response to his decision-the
outstanding decision of this century-in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, should be seen in retrospect as a badge of honor and greatness.
The strides this country made in the 1950s and 60s towards equality
under the law are directly attributable to our constitutional system,
which provides for an independent, vibrant judiciary-a judiciary not
coerced into making unfair and unjust decisions for fear of political
retribution.
As Justice Sanders stated, those courageous, independent judges
knew that "the law is not a matter of mechanical applications of
rules." History has shown that the truly great judges demonstrate a
special courage. According to Sanders, great judges are "sensitive to
injustice." "They realize that justice demands equality under the law,
and equality is brought about by application of the Golden Rule as
well as the Rule of Law."
I make these remarks today because I am deeply concerned about the
future of our judiciary and, indeed, our legal system. In my visits to law
schools, I find more and more students buying into the so-called Magoo
approach. The refrain is this is the law and if there is an injustice, then it
is for the legislature to change the law. I can state quite clearly that adju-
dicating disputes is not that simple. Every case has its own set of facts.
They cannot be ignored. For example, what is a court to do when it has
before it an American citizen in his mid 80s, a victim of the Holocaust
who is suing the German government for reparations.
He had first requested reparations from the German government but
was denied because at the time he was placed in a Concentration Camp
he was an American citizen and the German government said it would
pay reparations only to German citizens. The fact that he and his family
were Americans was of no significance to the Hitler government. The
family's Jewish heritage was all that mattered. During the family's incar-
ceration, the Plaintiff's parents, his two brothers, and his sister were
slaughtered by the Nazi's. I denied the government's motion to dismiss,
stating:
This court finds that the Federal Sovereign Immunity Act has no role
to play where the claims alleged involve undisputed acts of barba-
rism committed by a one-time outlaw nation which demonstrated
callous disrespect for the humanity of an American citizen, simply
because he was Jewish. The Court cannot permit such a nation,
which at the time these barbaric acts were committed neither recog-
nized nor respected U.S. or international law, to now block the legiti-
mate claims of a U.S. citizen by asserting U.S. law to evade its
responsibilities.1
On appeal I was reversed by a two to one decision. 2 The majority,
1. Princz v. F.R.G., 813 F. Supp. 22, 26 (D.D.C. 1992).
2. Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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reading the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) strictly, held:
The district court held that it had jurisdiction of the case on the
ground that the FSIA "has no role to play where the claims alleged
involve undisputed acts of barbarism committed by a one-time out-
law nation which demonstrated callous disrespect for the humanity
of an American citizen, simply because he was Jewish." 813 F. Supp.
22, 26 (D.D.C. 1992). As we shall see below, this is not the law.3
Specifically, the Court interpreting the various provisions of the FSIA
said:
As it turns out, however, we need not decide whether leasing prison-
ers as slave labor constitutes a commercial activity under the FSIA.
For certain it is that this activity did not have a "direct effect on the
United States."
b. Direct effect on the United States.
To be "direct" within the meaning of the FSIA an effect need not be
"substantial" or "foreseeable" so long as it is more than "purely triv-
ial" and "it follows 'as an immediate consequence of the defen-
dant's ... activity." Weltover, 112 5. Ct. at 2168 (citation omitted).
Germany here argues that the Nazis' enslavement of Mr. Princz in
Poland and Germany "had no impact, much less an immediate con-
sequence, in the United States." Mr. Princz, per contra, instances
three such effects.
First, Mr. Princz argues that the work he was required to perform as
a slave had a direct effect in this country because he worked for firms
directly supporting the Nazi war effort against the United States. A
"direct effect" however, "is one which has no intervening element,
but, rather, flows in a straight line without deviation or interruption."
Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 264, 266 (D.D.C. 1978), affd
mem. 607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Many events and actors neces-
sarily intervened between any work that Mr. Princz performed-as a
bricklayer for 1G. Farben in Poland or as a laborer in the Mes-
serschmidt aircraft works in Germany-and any effect felt in the
United States.
Finally, Mr. Princz argues that his continued suffering in the United
States is a direct effect of his forced labor under the Nazi yoke. Af-
ter Mr. Princz was liberated by the United States Army he spent
time recuperating in a military hospital. From there he went to
Czechoslovakia to search for relatives and to attend to his family's
property, only after which did he move to the United States. Mr.
Princz's subsequent suffering was clearly an effect, but just as clearly
not "a direct effect in the United States" of the Nazis' actions. Mr.
Princz was enslaved in Poland and Germany; the immediate conse-
quences of his enslavement were felt in those countries, and much
time passed before Mr. Princz came to this country. See Martin v.
Republic of South Africa, 836 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1987) (no "direct
effect" where South African government allegedly caused perma-
3. Id. at 1168.
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nent disability to American citizen who did not return to the United
States until more than a year later).
We therefore hold that even if the Nazis' leasing of Mr. Princz's la-
bor was a "commercial activity" within the meaning of the FSIA,
that activity did not have a "direct effect" in the United States. 4
I cite the Princz case to demonstrate that we seem to be retreating
from the concept that our Courts exist to do justice. I suggest that the
trend today clearly is the other way.
Since I am no longer a member of the Third Branch, there is little I can
do to change the course of events other than to try to persuade our future
leaders of the profession to think about where the legal system is going. I
would hope, after a careful evaluation of these various legal concepts,
that you would find merit in returning to the judicial principles of the
past. The ones, in my view, that contributed greatly to making this nation
the world class nation that it is.
4. Id. at 1172-73.
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